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Fairness and the Public Trustee
Concept: Time to Move On
Henry Geller*
My brief comments on Mr. Cronauer's comprehensive constitutional
assault on the Fairness Doctrine center on two points: (1) too little attention
is paid to the relationship between the doctrine and the public trustee
concept; and (2) policy considerations pertinent to that concept should be
determinative of the fairness dispute.
THE PUBLIC TRUSTEE CONCEPT
The Supreme Court has several times set out the rationale for the
governmental regulatory regime for broadcasting. Radio is inherently not
open to all. More people want to broadcast than there are available
frequencies, and the government, therefore, chooses one entity, and-to
prevent engineering chaos--enjoins all others from using the frequency.
This scarcity-based not on the number of broadcast outlets or a compari-
son of those outlets with other media, but on the number of those who seek
broadcast outlets compared to the number of frequencies available-is the
"unique characteristic" of radio that supports its regulatory scheme.' It is
undisputed that this same scarcity-more people wanting to broadcast than
there are available frequencies-exists today.
In conferring these scarce privileges, the government could have
required licensees to operate as common carriers. Or, as Mr. Justice White
pointed out in Red Lion:
Rather than confer frequency monopolies on a relatively small number
of licensees, in a Nation of 200,000,000, the Government surely could
have decreed that each frequency should be shared among all or some
of those who wish to use it, each being assigned a portion of the
broadcast day or the broadcast week.'
* Communications Fellow, The Markle Foundation.
1. See Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1969); NBC v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
2. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390-91.
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The government instead decided upon a public interest licensing
scheme. The broadcaster pays no money for this scarce privilege. But it
receives no property right in the frequency---"no right to an unconditional
monopoly of a scarce resource which the Government has denied others the
right to use."'3 Rather, to protect the First Amendment rights of others, the
broadcaster receives only a short term license and volunteers to serve the
public interest-to be a "fiduciary" for its community.'
The Fairness Doctrine is an integral and inevitable facet of this public
trustee obligation. A licensee must devote reasonable time to discussion of
controversial issues of public importance if it is to serve the public interest
and must do so fairly by affording a reasonable opportunity for conflicting
views. Otherwise, rather than being fiduciaries for their communities,
"station owners and a few networks would have unfettered power to make
time available only to the highest bidders, to communicate only their own
views on public issues, people and candidates, and to permit on the air only
those with whom they agreed."5
The leading case graphically points this out.6 The licensee, WLBT-
TV, Jackson, Mississippi, vigorously espoused only the segregationist point
of view and presented only the White Citizens Council, never the
NAACP.7 The court of appeals held that compliance with the Fairness
Doctrine is the "sine qua non" of every broadcast licensee,8 and that unlike
a newspaper, a broadcast station "is a public trust subject to termination for
breach of duty."9 Without the Fairness Doctrine, a broadcaster could assert
to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) at
renewal, "I am a racist and agree only with that viewpoint, so that is all
that I will present," and the agency would have to renew that broadcaster's
license-the antithesis of a public trustee-as serving the public interest.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
Mr. Cronauer is thus attacking the constitutionality of not only the
Fairness Doctrine but of the entire public trustee concept. Since that
concept interferes with editorial autonomy by requiring equal opportunities
for candidates (which the Court held to be indistinguishable from fairness
3. Id. at 391.
4. Id. at 389.
5. Id. at 392.
6. Office of Comm. of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
7. Id. at 998.
8. Id. at 1009.
9. Id. at 1003.
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"in terms of constitutional principles") ° or community-issue oriented
programming, the entire regulatory scheme is rendered nugatory. But this
flies in the face of Red Lion, where the Court squarely upheld the
constitutionality of the public trustee concept and fairness. Recently in the
case Metro Broadcasting, the Supreme Court again cited and relied upon
the public trustee concept and all its underpinnings."
It is argued that there is now a veritable explosion of broadcast
services. But there are still many more people who want to broadcast than
available frequencies. Further, the argument ignores the critical fact that
Red Lion was a radio case. In 1969 there were roughly 6900 radio stations;
today there are over 11,500.12 It cannot be seriously asserted that the
doctrine is constitutional at 7000 stations but unconstitutional at 11,500.
The argument that the doctrine chills rather than promotes debate has
been vigorously disputed by congressional committee reports, 3 and has
never been sustained in court review. 4 In any event, the Commission
should implement the doctrine in a way that eliminates or markedly reduces
any limited chilling effects and still accomplishes the governmental
interest-that the broadcaster act as a public fiduciary. 5 The Commission,
therefore, should not act on a case-by-case basis to determine fairness as
to each complaint; it is then not implementing the doctrine in a fashion
narrowly tailored to the goal. The goal is not to effect perfect fairness on
every issue covered by a licensee; that entails a deep intrusion into daily
editorial decisions, contrary to CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Commit-
tee. 6 Rather, the essential goal is to assure that overall the licensee acts
consistently with its public fiduciary responsibility, so that WLBT-TV
situations are remedied. In order to allow maximum breathing room for
robust, wide-open debate, the FCC should review fairness matters at
10. Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 391 (1969).
11. Metro Brdcst., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
12. 1 BROADCASTING & CABLE Y.B. B-604 (1994).
13. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 108, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-25 (1987); S. REP. No. 34,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-32 (1987).
14. See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 393. The Commission itself
acknowledged that the doctrine simply represents "sound journalistic practice." In Re
Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council against TV Station WTVH Syracuse, N.Y.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, para. 93 (1987), recons. denied, 3
FCC Rcd. 2035, para. 6 (1988), aj'd sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d
654, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990). For the Author's own
analysis of this issue, see generally HENRY GELLER, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IN
BROADCASTING: PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED COURSES OF ACTION (1973).
15. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984) (calling for action
in this sensitive area "narrowly tailored" to the substantial governmental interest).
16. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1973).
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renewal only under a New York Times Co. v. Sullivan standard, 7 deter-
mining whether the licensee has acted with malice in this area (i.e.,
deliberately violating the Fairness Doctrine as established by independent
extrinsic, evidence or a pattern of acting in reckless disregard of the
doctrine.)' 8
Mr. Cronauer argues for elimination of the Fairness Doctrine on
constitutional grounds. While I have disputed those grounds, I also would
eliminate the doctrine, but on policy grounds. As shown, it is an integral
part of the public trustee concept, and that concept has failed as a matter
of policy.
The commercial broadcaster faces strong competitive pressures.
Presentation of public service programming generally garners smaller
audiences and thus is not as profitable to the commercial broadcaster. If the
broadcaster is to forego maximizing its profit, there must be objective,
effective regulations requiring public service programming from all
licensees (e.g., regulation requiring a reasonable amount of local or
informational programming-including for children--during the time
periods 6 a.m. to midnight and in prime time). The situation here is no
different from that as to pollution controls. The competitive industry
structure does not assure against pollution of the air or water; only clear
regulation, applicable reasonably and fairly to all, can accomplish that.
The FCC, however, has never adopted objective, effective standards
of public service for broadcasting. On the contrary, it has specifically
rejected such an approach and deliberately followed vague standards. 9
Today the FCC receives no programming information when it grants an
initial license."0 As a result of the FCC's 1981 Radio Deregulation"' and
1984 Television Deregulation proceedings," the Commission renews all
17. New York Times, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18. The FCC rejected this approach. See In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the
Commission's Rules and Regs. Concerning Alternatives to the Gen. Fairness Doctrine
Obligations of Brdcst. Licensees, Report of the Commission, 2 FCC Rcd. 5272, para. 53
(1987); see also Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 665-66 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(affirming the rejection) cert. denied 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
19. National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 589 F.2d 578, 580-81 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
20. Office of Comm. of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 911 F.2d 803, 809-12
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
21. In re Deregulation of Radio, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d 797
(1981); In re Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, paras. 69-72, 114-
15 (1980).
22. In re Revision of Requirements for Commercial TV Stations, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 358 (1986); In re Revision of Programming and Ascertainment




broadcast licenses with only a postcard before it and thus has no knowledge
of public service activities, with one exception.23 It places "near total
reliance" on the public to bring to its attention inadequate performance. 24
Such reliance misplaces FCC responsibility; the public is not motivated to
inspect station records of public service. The FCC initially promised
random audits of stations,25 but never conducted a single one. It then did
away with even this aspect of regulation, contending the marketplace was
working.26 It has never monitored the results of its deregulatory actions.
Its comparative hearing process is in shambles, and its comparative renewal
effort has been a total failure.27
It makes no sense to try to impose effective, behavioral regulation for
the first time in this decade when conventional television faces such fierce
and increasing competition, and viewership is declining rather than
growing. It would be much sounder to truly deregulate broadcasting by
eliminating the public trustee requirement and in its place substituting a
reasonable spectrum fee imposed on existing stations (and an auction for
all new frequency assignments), with the sums so obtained dedicated to
public telecommunications (noncommercial operations on conventional
broadcasting, cable, DBS, VCR, etc.).
The spectrum usage fee, based on a percentage of gross revenue, can
be established by Congress at a reasonable figure without disrupting the
industry (e.g., 1 percent for radio; 2 or 3 percent for television). Those
figures today would net roughly $90 million in radio and $500 to $800
million in television.28 The fee could be the subject of a long-term
contract (e.g., 15 years) between the FCC and the broadcaster, so that it is
not subject to the vagaries of government policy changes toward the media.
For the first time, we would have a structure that works to accomplish
explicit policy goals. The commercial system would continue to do what
it already does-deliver a great variety of entertainment and news-type
programs. The noncommercial system would have the funds to accomplish
23. Under the Children's Television Act of 1990, the television broadcast licensee must
make a public service showing as to children. Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996 (codified
at 47 U.S.C. §§ 303a-303b, 393a, 394 (Supp. IV 1992)). The efficacy of this requirement
is still in doubt.
24. See Office of Comm. of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1441-
42 (D.C. Cir. 1983), later proceeding, 779 F.2d 702, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
25. See Radio Brdcst. Serv.: Revision of App'ns for Renewal of License of Commercial
and Noncommercial AM, FM, and TV Licenses, Report and Order, 46 Fed. Reg. 26,236,
49 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 740, para. 31 (1981).
26. Report and Order, supra note 22, paras. 80-83.
27. See FCC Freezes Comparative Proceedings in Response to Court Integration
Ruling, CoMM. DAILY, Feb. 28, 1994, at 3.
28. 62 TELEvIsION AND CABLE Y.B. 1, 13-14 (1994).
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its goals-to supply needed public service such as educational program-
ming for children, cultural fare, minority presentations, and in-depth
informational programs. The current First Amendment strains would be
eliminated. For only by ending the public interest licensing scheme can
broadcast journalists be placed on the same footing as their print counter-
parts. Removing the Fairness Doctrine would not accomplish this, since an
administration intending to chill opposition would not seek to skew fairness
rulings, which are subject to searching judicial scrutiny, but would try to
manipulate the public trustee process, such as in the comparative renewal
area.
29
By acting in this fashion, Congress would be adopting essentially the
print model for broadcasting (thus very largely removing the present First
Amendment strains), would be ending the asymmetric regulation of
broadcast and cable (the viewer makes no distinction between the two), and
would rationalize the public interest goals for this sector by directly
promoting and thus obtaining public service.
The broadcasters would oppose this revision. They like being called
public trustees as long as the concept is never really enforced, and they
would certainly oppose any spectrum fee, no matter what the First
Amendment gains may be. The bottom line for them is the bottom line.
They have great clout with Congress, and it will be an uphill battle, to say
the least, to obtain the needed reform. In the end, the driving forces of
technology and the market will eventually sweep away this ineffectual
regulatory scheme, but it may take a decade or more to accomplish this and
to end the present regulatory charade.3"
29. See generally Henry Geller, The Comparative Renewal Process in Television:
Problems and Suggested Solutions, 61 VA. L. REv. 471, 498 n.143 (1975).
30. For a more complete discussion of this reform, see Henry Geller, Broadcasting, in
I NEW DIRECTIONS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 125 (Paula R. Newberg ed., 1989).
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